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TRYING TO FIT AN OVAL SHAPED ISLAND
INTO A SQUARE CONSTITUTION:
ARGUMENTS FOR
PUERTO RICAN STATEHOOD
Jos6 D. Romdn*
INTRODUCTION
The presidential election between Albert Gore and George W.
Bush in 2000 provided an interesting lesson on voting in America.
The closeness of the race' highlighted the importance of the right
to vote and gave some truth to the phrase "every vote counts."' 2 In
addition, a recount prompted by Gore in Florida yielded varying
results, illustrating the surprising fact that every election has its
share of uncounted votes.3 While the nation's attention was fo-
* Josd D. Romin is a J.D. candidate at Fordham University School of Law. He
received a B.S. with honors in Administration of Justice and Political Science from
Rutgers College in 1998. I would like to thank Professor James Fleming for his gui-
dance and criticism on the original version of this Comment. I also take this opportu-
nity to thank the editors and staff members of the Fordham Urban Law Journal for
their insight and diligence. I give special thanks to the loves of my life: Jennifer,
Angela, and Alex Romin. I dedicate this work to my parents, Zenida M. Vega and
Josd L. RomAn.
1. Former Vice President Al Gore contested the results of the election in Florida,
where it was estimated that Texas Governor George W. Bush won by less than 2000
votes. See Rick Bragg, Florida, Amid Recount, Learns the Power of One, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 2000, at A7 (chronicling the reactions of voters in Florida following the elec-
tion). Although it is estimated that Gore won the popular vote by more than 500,000,
Bush took the presidency by defeating Gore in the Electoral College with 271 votes,
just one more than he needed for the required majority. See David Stout, Gore's
Lead in the Popular Vote Now Exceeds 500,000, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2000, at All.
Bush's win in the Electoral College was secured only after the U.S. Supreme Court,
by a vote of five to four, ordered a halt to the recounting of the disputed votes in
Florida. See Linda Greenhouse, By Single Vote, Justices End Recount, Blocking Gore
After 5-Week Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2000, at Al (commenting on the final
outcome of the election).
2. See Bragg, supra note 1, at A7 (noting that children are taught that every vote
counts in civics class).
3. John Lewis, Now We Know That Not All Votes Count, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2,
2000, at A19 (expressing concern over the uncounted votes in Florida). "Nationwide
statistics reveal that an estimated 2% of ballots cast do not register a vote for Presi-
dent for whatever reason, including deliberately choosing no candidate at all or some
voter error, such as voting for two candidates or insufficiently marking a ballot." Bush
v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000) (per curiam).
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cused on the historic spectacle in the Sunshine State, few were
aware of the noteworthy events also unfolding in Puerto Rico.4
Many Americans are aware that Puerto Rico joined the United
States in 18985 and that the Puerto Rican people became citizens in
1917.6 Most Americans outside of Puerto Rico are nevertheless
unaware that the U.S. citizens who live on the island have never
had the right to vote in presidential elections.7 This puzzling cir-
cumstance was challenged in anticipation of the 2000 presidential
election in Igartua de la Rosa v. United States 11.8 The Federal Dis-
trict Court of Puerto Rico held that the 3.8 million people residing
on the island,9 2.4 million of whom are registered voters, 10 had a
fundamental right to vote in presidential elections based on their
American citizenship." The First Circuit quickly reversed this bold
ruling, holding that Article II of the Constitution grants the power
to elect the president only to the states, and not to the people. 12
This Comment highlights Puerto Rico's continuing political trou-
bles under the U.S. Constitution and argues that the island must
become the United States' fifty-first state. Part I explores the his-
tory of Puerto Rico's relationship with the United States. The In-
sular Cases are discussed to illustrate Puerto Rico's peculiar status
4. Edda Ponsa-Flores, Citizens Who Can't Vote for President, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
2000, at A39 (describing the legal battle that took place in Puerto Rico over whether
its people could vote in presidential elections).
5. Treaty of Paris, Dec. 10, 1898, U.S.-Spain, 30 Stat. 1754, reprinted in Docu-
MENTS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PUERTO Rico 47 (Office of the Com-
monwealth of P.R. ed., 2d ed. 1964). The Treaty of Paris of 1898 formally ended the
Spanish-American War and legitimized the acquisition of Puerto Rico.
6. Jones Act § 5, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951, 953 (1917) (current version at 48 U.S.C.
§§ 731 et seq. (2002)).
7. See Ponsa-Flores, supra note 4, at A39 (noting that the Consitution does not
guarantee citizens the right to vote).
8. Igartua de la Rosa v. United States II, 113 F. Supp. 2d 228 (D.P.R.), rev'd, 229
F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 2000). Note, the district court adopted and incorporated its prior
opinion denying the government's motion to dismiss. Id. at 231. Therefore, Igartua de
la Rosa v. United States H, 107 F. Supp. 2d 140 (D.P.R. 2000), must be read as part of
the district court's final opinion.
9. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2001
812 (121st ed. 2001). See Michael Hedges, Census Gives Texas Two New House Seats:
State Displaces N.Y as No. 2 In Population, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Dec. 29, 2000, at
Al (commenting on 2000 census figures).
10. Ponsa-Flores, supra note 4, at A39.
11. Igartua de la Rosa II, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 145.
12. Igartua de la Rosa II, 229 F.3d at 83-4. The Court of Appeals relied substan-
tially on Igartua de la Rosa v. United States 1, 842 F. Supp. 607, affd, 32 F.3d 8 (D.P.R.
1994). Article II provides: "Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legisla-
ture thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Sena-
tors and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress." U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
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under the Constitution. In addition, the legal insignificance of the
island's evolution to commonwealth status will be discussed, lead-
ing to the conclusion that Puerto Rico must choose statehood to
remedy its constitutional status problems.
Part II reviews Igartua de la Rosa II and other relevant cases.
This Part highlights the basis for limiting the right to vote in presi-
dential elections to citizens who reside in the fifty states. It argues
that the First Circuit was correct in denying this right to the people
of Puerto Rico in Igartua de la Rosa H. Part II further asserts that
the First Circuit's ruling is a clear signal to the people of Puerto
Rico that statehood is necessary to fully legitimize their political
status in the United States. Part II then considers whether the peo-
ple of Puerto Rico are entitled to vote in presidential elections by
virtue of their citizenship and discusses whether the Constitution
grants any citizens the right to vote. This Part concludes that, at
best, the Supreme Court has only recognized a limited right to vote
based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. 3 The
argument for statehood is then revisited in light of these voting
rights issues.
1. PUERTO Rico's STATUS IN THE UNITED STATES
A discussion of Puerto Rico's status within the United States is
necessary before discussing the constitutional rights of the citizens
who live on the island. Specifically, the constitutional distinctions
between Puerto Rico and the fifty states must be drawn out. This
area of constitutional law has been largely ignored by academics,
but fiercely criticized by those affected.
A. The Acquisition of Puerto Rico
Prior to the Spanish American War, Puerto Rico was a province
of the Spanish Kingdom, governed under the Spanish Constitution
of 1876.14 As Spanish citizens, Puerto Ricans enjoyed representa-
tion in the Spanish Parliament' 5 and autonomy on matters of local
concern.' 6 When the war ended, Puerto Rico was ceded to the
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall.., deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
14. DOCUMENTS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PUERTO Rico 2 (Office of
the Commonwealth of P.R. ed., 2d ed. 1964).
15. Igartua de la Rosa II, 229 F.3d at 85 n.3 (Torruella, J., concurring) (citation
omitted).
16. Automatic Charter of 1897, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL HISTORY OF PUERTO Rico 22 (Office of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
ed., 2d ed. 1964) (reprinted under the heading Constitution Establishing Self-Govern-
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United States under the Treaty of Paris of 1898.17 The U.S. held
the island under a military government until 1900.18 During this
period it was generally believed that Puerto Rico had been an-
nexed into the Union and that Puerto Ricans were United States
citizens.' 9
Before long, pressure from the domestic beet-sugar and tobacco
industries, backed by other imperialist and racist influences,
sparked political debate on Puerto Rico's status within the
Union.z0 Some advocated the creation of a special status for Pu-
erto Rico that justified governing the island without the usual con-
stitutional restraints.2 1 In particular, some lawmakers argued that
the Constitution gave Congress plenary power over all newly ac-
quired territory.22 Despite significant opposition, this framework
for unequal treatment became law when Congress passed the
Foraker Act 23 and the United States Supreme Court decided the
Insular Cases.
B. The Insular Cases
The Foraker Act provided for the establishment of a civil gov-
ernment in Puerto Rico 24 and granted its people "Puerto Rican cit-
izenship. '25 The most controversial feature of the Act was a
section that imposed tariffs on goods imported and exported be-
ment in the Island of Puerto Rico by Spain in 1897). Under the Automatic Charter of
1897, Spain gave Puerto Rico the power to: legislate on matters of civil administration
and public health; formulate its local budget; and enter into commercial treaties. Id. at
36-9.
17. Treaty of Paris, supra note 5; DOCUMENTS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF PUERTO Rico, supra note 14, at 2.
18. DOCUMENTS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PUERTO Rico, supra note
14, at 2.
19. Gabriel A. Terrasa, The United States, Puerto Rico, and the Territorial Incorpo-
ration Doctrine: Reaching a Century of Constitutional Authoritarianism, 31 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 55, 61 (1997) (discussing the political climate surrounding the
acquisition of Puerto Rico).
20. Id. at 61-64.
21. ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN
U.S. HISTORY 432 (1997).
22. Terrasa, supra note 19, at 65.
23. Foraker Act, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900) (current version at 48 U.S.C. §§ 731 et
seq. (2002)).
24. Foraker Act §§ 6-40, 31 Stat. at 79-86.
25. Foraker Act § 7, 31 Stat. at 79; JAMES L. DIETZ, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF PU-
ERTO RICO: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT 87 (1986). Pu-
erto Rican citizens were not eligible for any type of passport; thus they could not
legally travel, even to the United States. Id.
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tween the mainland and the island.26 Many disagreed with these
provisions27 and argued that a tariff bill for Puerto Rico violated
the Constitution's Uniform Taxation Clause.28 The Republican
majority rejected this argument and contended that a tariff was the
only way to raise revenue for Puerto Rico.29 This contention was
also an "open challenge to the U.S. Supreme Court to decide
whether the Constitution applied with equal force to" Puerto
Rico.3°
The Insular Cases settled this debate. In De Lima v. Bidwell,31
the plaintiff sought to recover duties paid on sugar products im-
ported from Puerto Rico.32 The central issue was whether a terri-
tory acquired from a foreign power remains foreign for the
purposes of U.S. tariff laws.33 The Supreme Court held that the
tariffs were invalid because Puerto Rico became a domestic terri-
tory upon ratification of the Treaty of Paris, "although not an or-
ganized territory in the technical sense of the word. ' 34 The Court
noted that the political branches had previously treated ceded ter-
ritory as domestic, not foreign, in all cases except for the Louisiana
Territory: 35
The theory that a country remains foreign with respect to the
tariff laws until Congress has acted by embracing it within the
customs union presupposes that a country may be domestic for
one purpose and foreign for another... This theory also presup-
poses that territory may be held indefinitely by the United
States; that it may be treated in every particular, except for tariff
purposes, as domestic territory;... that everything may be done
which a government can do within its own boundaries, and yet
that the territory may still remain a foreign country. To hold
26. Foraker Act §§ 2-5, 31 Stat. at 77-79; Terrasa, supra note 19, at 64-66.
27. Terrasa, supra note 19, at 64-66.
28. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have the Power to lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the com-
mon Defense and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and
Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.").
29. Terrasa, supra note 19, at 66.
30. Id. at 67.
31. De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 174.
34. Id. at 196-97, 200. Similarly, in Huus v. New York & Porto Rico Steamship Co.,
182 U.S. 392, 393-97 (1901), the last of the Insular Cases, the Court unanimously held
that trade with Puerto Rico became domestic within the meaning of a cabotage stat-
ute upon ratification of the Treaty of Paris. Note that U.S. officials changed the spell-
ing of Puerto Rico to "Porto" Rico, "an Americanized corruption of Spanish that
remained the official spelling until 1932." DIETZ, supra note 25, at 85.
35. De Lima, 182 U.S. at 187-94.
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that this can be done as a matter of law we deem to be pure
judicial legislation. We find no warrant for it in the Constitution
or in the powers conferred upon this court. We are unable to
acquiesce in this assumption that a territory may be at the same
time both foreign and domestic.3 6
This language has been described as "nothing short of amaz-
ing"'37 when compared to the holding in Downes v. Bidwell, one of
the later Insular Cases.38 These words also continue to ring with
irony considering that Puerto Rico is a model for how a territory
can be held indefinitely by the United States.39
The next case before the Court, Goetze v. United States,n° has
little significance beyond its historical context.4 1 Here, the Court
followed De Lima, and swiftly reversed a lower court's ruling that
Puerto Rico was foreign within the meaning of the tariff laws. 41
The Court then decided Dooley v. United States,n3 in which the
plaintiff sought to recover duties paid on goods exported from New
York to Puerto Rico during the period of U.S. military occupation
of the island prior to the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. The
Court held that Puerto Rico remained a de jure foreign country
during that time and did not belong to the United States until the
treaty was ratified.4 The imposition of the duties was therefore
held to be a valid exercise of the war power.4 5
Although its holding is difficult to reconcile with the result in De
Lima, Downes v. Bidwel 46 became "the central case on the ques-
tion of Puerto Rico's status within the Union at that stage in his-
tory. ' 47 In Downes, the plaintiff sought to recover duties paid for
36. Id. at 198-99.
37. JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO Rico: THE Doc-
TRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 43 (1985).
38. Infra notes 46-79 and accompanying text.
39. TORRUELLA, supra note 37 at 43-44.
40. Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901).
41. See TORRUELLA, supra note 37, at 45-46. The decision applied to two cases
that had been joined, one involving Puerto Rico and the other involving Hawaii. Id.
Hawaii would eventually achieve statehood, while Puerto Rico remained in legal
limbo. Id.
42. 182 U.S. at 221-22.
43. Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901).
44. Id. at 230.
45. Id.; see also Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901) (presenting the
same issues as Dooley). The war power includes the constitutional authority of Con-
gress to declare war and maintain armed forces and the president's power to conduct
war as commander-in-chief. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl., 11-14; U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 2, cl. 1.
46. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
47. TORRUELLA, supra note 37, at 48.
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goods shipped from Puerto Rico to New York after the passage of
the Foraker Act.48 The Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Foraker Act's tariffs on imports and exports.4 9 A plurality of the
Court advanced varying justifications for this apparent change of
position.
Justice Brown's opinion began by noting that nothing in the
Constitution's historical development justified a finding that it ap-
plied directly to the territories. 50 He argued that the Constitution
was limited to "states, their people, and their representatives. '51
Next, Justice Brown analyzed the Court's earlier decisions and
found no basis for the notion that the Constitution applies to a
territory prior to an act of Congress .5  He concluded that the Con-
stitution's "Uniform Taxation Clause, 53 which requires uniform
taxation "throughout the United States," was not binding on Con-
gress when legislating for the territories. 4
Justice Brown further noted that there are "no limitations upon
the power of Congress" in dealing with the territories because no
such limitation is expressed in the "Territory Clause. ' 55 The Terri-
tory Clause provides that "The Congress shall have Power to dis-
pose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States. ' 56 Jus-
tice Brown's conclusions with regard to congressional power were
tempered somewhat by the following passage:
We suggest ... that there may be a distinction between certain
natural rights ... and what may be termed artificial or remedial
rights which are peculiar to our own system of jurisprudence.
[Natural rights might include freedom of religion, speech, and
the press; the right to personal liberty, property, due process,
equal protection, and free access to courts; immunities from un-
reasonable searches and seizures, cruel and unusual punish-
ments, and other immunities that are indispensable to a free
government. Artificial rights include] the rights of citizenship,
to suffrage and to the particular methods of procedure pointed
out in the Constitution which are peculiar to Anglo-Saxon juris-
prudence, and some of which have already been held by the
48. Downes, 182 U.S. at 247-48.
49. Id. at 287.
50. Id. at 250-51.
51. Id. at 251.
52. Id. at 258-73.
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
54. Downes, 182 U.S. at 287.
55. Id. at 285.
56. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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states to be unnecessary to the proper protection of individuals.
Whatever may be finally decided.., as to the status of [Puerto
Rico, it does not follow that its] people are in the matter of per-
sonal rights unprotected by the provisions of our Constitution. 7
Justice White's concurrence outlined what would later be recog-
nized as the rule of the Insular Cases. Justice White began by not-
ing that he would extend the applicability of the Constitution to the
territories, but might limit the operation of certain provisions in
light of "the situation of the territory and its relations to the United
States. '5 8 Justice White then offered a distinction between "incor-
porated" and "unincorporated" territories.5 9 Under this incorpora-
tion theory, incorporated territories are destined to become states
and form an integral part of the U.S., thus entitling them to equal
treatment under the Constitution.6 ° In contrast, unincorporated
territories are a part of the U.S. in an international sense, but for-
eign in a domestic sense. 61 Thus, an unincorporated territory is
"merely . . . a possession ' 62 and has no significant legal status
under the Constitution.63
Justice White argued that Congress is limited only by the provi-
sions of the Constitution protecting the liberty and property of the
people when legislating for an unincorporated territory.64 Thus,
only fundamental natural rights65 apply to such territories. 66 Jus-
tice White further argued that Congress had the power to withhold
the incorporation of a territory into the Union.67 He found that
Congress had declined to incorporate Puerto Rico into the Union
because the Treaty of Paris68 did not provide for its incorporation.
69
57. Downes, 182 U.S. at 282-83.
58. Id. at 293 (White, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 292, 299, 317 (White, J., concurring).
60. Id. (White, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 341-42 (White, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 342 (White, J., concurring).
63. See Downes, 182 U.S. at 342.
64. Id. at 294-95 (White, J., concurring).
65. Natural rights include freedom of religion, speech, and press; the right to per-
sonal liberty, property, due process, equal protection, and free access to courts; immu-
nities from unreasonable searches and seizures, cruel and unusual punishments, and
other immunities that are indispensable to a free government. Supra note 57 and
accompanying text.
66. Downes, 182 U.S. at 294-95.
67. Id. at 336 (White, J., concurring).
68. Supra note 5.
69. Downes, 182 U.S at 336 (White, J., concurring).
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Thus, he concluded that the Uniform Taxation Clause did not ap-
ply to Puerto Rico.70
The dissenting opinions in Downes greatly criticized the major-
ity. Chief Justice Fuller's dissent argued that the Uniform Taxation
Clause required uniformity throughout the geographical United
States because the United States is composed of both states and
territories.7 He noted that "the national government is a govern-
ment of enumerated powers ... [and] .. .[t]he powers delegated
by the people to their agents are not enlarged by the expansion of
the domain within which they are exercised."72 In addressing Jus-
tice White's incorporation theory, the Chief Justice argued that
such a theory
assumes that the Constitution created a government empowered
to acquire countries throughout the world, to be governed by
different rules than those obtaining in the original States and
territories, and substitutes for the present system of republican
government, a system of domination over distant provinces in
the exercise of unrestricted power.73
The Chief Justice concluded that the duties imposed by the
Foraker Act were unconstitutional because Congress was bound by
the Constitution and thus the Uniform Taxation Clause, when leg-
islating for the territories.74
Critics of the Insular Cases often cite Justice Harlan's dissent.
Justice Harlan noted that "[T]he Constitution speaks ... to all peo-
ple, whether of States or territories, who are subject to the author-
ity of the United States."75 He emphasized that Congress has no
existence or power outside of the Constitution.76 Justice Harlan
did not believe that Congress could acquire territory under powers
enumerated in the Constitution, while simultaneously excluding
the Constitution from operating in that territory.77 He further
noted that "The idea that this country may acquire territories any-
where upon the earth, by conquest or treaty, and hold them as
70. Id. at 342 (White, J., concurring). Justice Gray also wrote a concurring opinion.
Justice Gray's opinion is similar to Justice White's concurrence, but it could be inter-
preted as yielding greater power to Congress than the other majority opinions. His
opinion was never followed by the Court and does not warrant further comment. See
TORRUELLA, supra note 37, at 56-57.
71. Downes, 182 U.S. at 353 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 359 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 373 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 373-75 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 378 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 380 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 379-80 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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mere colonies or provinces,-the people inhabiting them to enjoy
only such rights as Congress chooses to accord to them-is wholly
inconsistent with the spirit and genius as well as with the words,of
the Constitution.""8 He concluded that the Foraker Act's tariff bill
was unconstitutional because Puerto Rico became part of the
United States and subject to the Constitution upon ratification of
the Treaty of Paris. 79
The Supreme Court adopted Justice White's incorporation the-
ory in Dorr v. United States, ° where it concluded that the right to a
jury trial was not a fundamental right applicable to unincorporated
territories, but merely a method of procedure.8 ' Justice Harlan's
dissent once again criticized the Court for suspending the opera-
tion of the Constitution in the territories.82
In 1917 Congress realized that a disgruntled colony was a dan-
gerous liability in an era of world war and grudgingly passed the
Jones Act.83 The Jones Act granted Puerto Ricans United States
citizenship and a new civil government that included a Bill of
Rights.84 Many believed that the grant of citizenship was sufficient
to incorporate Puerto Rico into the Union because this was appar-
ently a clear move towards statehood.85 Balzac v. Porto Rico
[sic], 86 however, resolved that issue. In Balzac, a newspaper editor
in Puerto Rico was found guilty of libel without a jury trial.87 The
Court unanimously held that the Jones Act had no effect on Puerto
Rico's status as an unincorporated territory and therefore Con-
gress had not extended the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial to
Puerto Rico.88 The Court found the granting of citizenship to Pu-
erto Ricans to be "entirely consistent with non-incorporation. '89
Any thought that the Insular Cases were of only historical inter-
est was erased in 199090 when they were cited extensively by the
78. Id. at 380 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 391 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
80. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904).
81. Id. at 144-45.
82. Id. at 155-58 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
83. Jones Act, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951 (1917) (current version at 48 U.S.C. §§ 731 et
seq. (2002)); SMITH, supra note 21, at 433.
84. Jones Act §§ 2, 5, 39 Stat. at 951-53.
85. Terrasa, supra note 19, at 83.
86. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
87. Id. at 300.
88. Id. at 305-11.
89. Id. at 308.
90. Jon M. Van Dyke, The Evolving Relationships Between the United States and
its Affiliated U.S.-Flag Islands, 14 U. HAW. L. REV. 445, 455-56 (1992) (analyzing the
current legal status of all of the U.S. territories).
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Supreme Court in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.9' There the
Court held that the Fourth Amendment9 2 does prohibit the search
and seizure of property that is located in a foreign country and
owned by a nonresident alien.93 To hold otherwise, the Court rea-
soned, would be contrary to the Insular Cases, which held that not
every constitutional provision applies to governmental activity in
the territories.94
C. The Significance of Commonwealth Status
By 1950, pressure from the Puerto Rican people95 prompted
Congress to enact Public Law 600,96 a statute that offered Puerto
Rico a chance to establish a local government.97 Puerto Ricans
soon enacted their own constitution and Congress recognized the
island's transition to "commonwealth status. ' 98 At the time, it was
assumed that Puerto Rico's status within the United States had
fundamentally changed, and that the Puerto Rican government
would be free from plenary congressional control. 99 Furthermore,
it was believed that neither Congress nor the Puerto Rican legisla-
ture could alter the island's status unilaterally."' Apparently, Pu-
erto Rico had achieved state-like status in that it was sovereign
over matters not delegated to the federal government by the Con-
stitution. 10 1 This was, in fact, the U.S. government's apparent posi-
tion as expressed in a 1961 memorandum by President Kennedy:
91. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
92. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." The Forth Amendment protects the people from unreasonable
searches and seizures by the government. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265-66. The
Court notes that historical data shows that it was meant to protect the people against
arbitrary action against their own government and was never intended to protect
aliens outside of United States territory. Id.
93. Id. at 261.
94. Id. at 268.
95. Van Dyke, supra note 90, at 473.
96. Pub. L. No. 600, ch. 446, 64 Stat. 319 (1950) (current version at 48 U.S.C.
§§ 731b-731e (2002)).
97. Van Dyke, supra note 90, at 473.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 474.
100. See id. (quoting a U.S. representative to the United Nations who defined the
new relationship between the U.S. and Puerto Rico as a "compact," (i.e., an agree-
ment that cannot be altered by either party without consent)).
101. See id. at 473.
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The Commonwealth structure, and its relationship to the United
States which is in the nature of a compact, provide for self-gov-
ernment in respect of internal affairs and administration, subject
only to the applicable provisions of the Federal Constitution, the
Puerto Rican Federal Regulations Act, and the acts of Congress
authorizing and approving the constitution. 10 2
Despite this historic change, the Supreme Court has failed to
recognize the significance of Puerto Rico's transition to common-
wealth status and has continued to refer to Congress's broad power
under the Territory Clause, °3 as established by the Insular Cases.
The Court has upheld reduced social security and welfare benefits
for Puerto Ricans, reasoning that under the Territory Clause, Con-
gress "may treat Puerto Rico differently from States so long as
there is a rational basis for its actions. ' 10 4 As one commentator
suggested, applying a "'rational basis"' test to the Territory Clause
leaves the near absolute power of Congress over Puerto Rico unaf-
fected.10 5 This empowers Congress to continue to exercise plenary
power over Puerto Rico, including the power to withhold federal
programs and fundamental political rights'0 6 from the citizens who
reside on the island.
On occasion, the First Circuit has taken a more progressive ap-
proach toward Puerto Rico,0 7 seeming to be more comfortable
with the position that congressional authority over the Common-
wealth is no longer derived from the Territory Clause. 0 8 This line
102. President's Memorandum to the Heads of the Executive Departments and
Agencies Concerning the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 26 Fed. Reg. 6695 (July 25,
1961), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PUERTO Rico
206 (Office of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico ed., 2d ed. 1964).
103. Van Dyke, supra note 90, at 452.
104. Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651-52 (1980) (welfare benefits); see also
Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 5 (1978) (social security benefits).
105. Van Dyke, supra note 90, at 477 n.177.
106. See note 57 and accompanying text.
107. Van Dyke, supra note 90, at 478.
108. United States v. Quinones, 758 F.2d 40, 42-43 (1st Cir. 1985) (cautiously hold-
ing that a federal wiretapping statute superceded Article II, § 10 of the Puerto Rico
Constitution, which explicitly prohibited wiretapping, because "Congress maintains
similar powers over Puerto Rico as it possesses over the federal states").
[I]n 1952, Puerto Rico ceased being a territory of the United States subject
to the plenary powers of Congress as provided in the Federal Constitution.
The authority exercised by the federal government emanated thereafter
from the compact itself. Under the compact between the people of Puerto
Rico and the United States, Congress cannot amend the Puerto Rico Consti-
tution unilaterally, and the government of Puerto Rico is no longer a federal
government agency exercising delegated power.
Id. at 42 (citing Mora v. Mejias, 206 F.2d 377, 386-88 (1st Cir. 1953)).
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of thinking argues that Congress has relinquished its plenary power
over the island by recognizing commonwealth status, thus leaving
Puerto Rico sovereign over matters not delegated to the federal
government. 10 9 As previously noted, this is not the law according
to the U.S. Supreme Court which has repeatedly held that Puerto
Rico's transition to Commonwealth status has had no effect on its
treatment under the Constitution.'10
D. Military Service and Federal Taxation
Historically, all governments have two basic components: a
means of coercion, such as an army or police force, and a means of
collecting revenue."' Indeed, it would be difficult for the United
States government to maintain the ideals of democracy and free-
dom without these components.1 2 One of the U.S. government's
primary tools of coercion is compulsory military conscription or
"the draft."' 3 Likewise, its principal mechanism for collecting rev-
enue is the federal income tax. 14
Although these issues are often raised within the context of na-
tional voting rights,"1 5 they are also relevant to the general discus-
sion of Puerto Rico's relationship with the United States. This
section explores Puerto Rico's contributions to the United States in
terms of military service and its exclusion from the federal income
tax system. It then highlights the reasons for removing these fac-
tors from a purly legal discussion on voting rights.
1. Military Service
The island of Puerto Rico has been characterized as "irreplacea-
ble" in terms of strategic defense and national security.' 6 The
continuous military service provided by Puerto Ricans over the
past century is also significant. In 1906 President Theodore
109. Supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
110. Supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text.
111. THEODORE J. Lowi & BENJAMIN GINSBERG, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT:
FREEDOM AND POWER 9 (3d ed. 1994)
112. Id.
113. Id. at 10.
114. Id.
115. See Amber L. Cottle, Comment, Silent Citizens: United States Territorial Re-
sidents and the Right to Vote in Presidential Elections, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 315, 327-
30 (1995) (discussing military service and the payment of taxes as reasons for the
passage of the Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth Amendments).
116. Humberto Garcfa Muniz, U.S. Military Installations in Puerto Rico: Control-
ling the Caribbean, in COLONIAL DILEMMA: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CONTEMPO-
RARY PUERTO RICO 53 (Edwin Melndez & Edgardo Melndez eds., 1993).
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Roosevelt recommended that the Porto Rican Regiment be made a
permanent body, noting that he was "struck by the excellent char-
acter" of its troops. 17 When World War I began, Congress passed
a bill establishing compulsory military service that expressly ex-
cluded Puerto Ricans.' 18 Puerto Rico, however, immediately pro-
tested and demanded that its people be sent to fight as well.1 19 Out
of the 1.3 million inhabitants of Puerto Rico at that time, 140,000
soldiers were mobilized without a single deserter.12 0 Since then,
Puerto Ricans have served in every conflict involving the United
States.' 21 In the Korean War, many Puerto Rican servicemen were
sent into the sub-arctic region of North Korea and fought in some
of the bloodiest sections of the conflict. 122 In addition, Puerto Ri-
cans continue to be subject to the draft and a very high proportion
of Puerto Rican servicemen have been volunteers. In fact, it was
once reported that the island's percentage of volunteers exceeds
that of most states. 123
It might be argued that service in the military entitles citizens to
political rights, including the right to participate in national elec-
tions.' 24 In fact, this was one of the chief arguments in support of
the passage of the Twenty-third Amendment, which allows re-
sidents of the District of Columbia to participate in presidential
elections. 25 Although there is moral force behind this assertion,
there are no legal grounds for suggesting that suffrage and other
political rights are at all related to military service. 126 Nonetheless,
117. THE PUERTO RICANS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 113 (Kal Waggenheim &
Olga Jimdnez de Waggenheim eds., 1996) [hereinafter THE PUERTO RICANS].
118. Id. at 145.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. AD Hoc ADVISORY GROUP ON THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE FOR PUERTO Rico, \
THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE FOR PUERTO Rico 8 (1971) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL
VOTE].
122. THE PUERTO RICANS, supra note 117, at 221.
123. PRESIDENTIAL VOTE, supra, note 121, at 8.
124. See Cottle, supra note 115, at 325-26.
125. Id. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII.
126. The clearest support for this argument is the Twenty-third and Twenty-sixth
Amendments to the Constitution. The former granted residents of the District of Co-
lumbia the right to vote in presidential elections, and the latter granted eighteen,
nineteen, and twenty-year-old citizens the right to vote in general. U.S. CONST.
amend XXIII; U.S. CONST. amend XXVI. These amendments were ratified in 1961
and 1971 respectively, but it is commonly known that these two groups of citizens
have always served in the armed forces. Thus, if one's eligibility for military service
triggered the right to vote, these amendments to the Constitution would have been
unnecessary. Furthermore, residents of the District of Columbia do not have any rep-
resentation in Congress.
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Puerto Ricans should be commended for their willingness to de-
fend a nation that has refused to grant them the rights afforded to
citizens of states. 27
2. Federal Taxation
Although the U.S. Treasury receives over two billion dollars an-
nually from sources in Puerto Rico,128 the internal revenue laws of
the United States generally do not apply to Puerto Rico. 129 As a
result, residents of Puerto Rico do not pay federal income taxes.13 °
Nonetheless, residents are subject to local taxes, which are higher
than those of all fifty states.13 1
It has been suggested that it is proper to withhold certain politi-
cal rights from citizens who are exempt from the national tax sys-
tem.' 32 It seems clear that the political right of suffrage cannot be
contingent on the payment of any tax.' 33 The most obvious sup-
port for this assertion is found in the Twenty-fourth Amendment,
which bans the payment of "any poll tax or other tax"' 34 as a pre-
requisite for voting in national elections. 5 The phrase "other tax"
includes income taxes,136 and the Supreme Court subsequently
banned the payment of taxes as a prerequisite for voting in state
elections. 37 In Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,38 the
Court used the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate a law provid-
ing for a $1.50 poll tax in state elections: "To introduce wealth or
payment of a fee as a measure of a voter's qualifications is to intro-
duce a capricious or irrelevant factor.' 39 As an advisory group
appointed by President Nixon later concluded, it is "unpersuasive
127. See THE PUERTO RICANS, supra note 117, at 145.
128. GREGORIO IGARTUA DE LA ROSA, U.S. DEMOCRACY FOR PUERTO Rico: A
DENIAL OF VOTING RIGHTS IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS TO OVER 3.5 MILLION
AMERICAN CITIZENS V (1996).
129. TAX AND TRADE GUIDE - PUERTO RICO 1 (Arthur Andersen & Co. ed., 3d
ed. 1978) [hereinafter TAX AND TRADE GUIDE]. As discussed above, Congress has
plenary power over Puerto Rico under the Territory Clause. Supra Part I.B. This
includes the authority to exclude Puerto Rico from the internal revenue laws. Id.
130. TAX AND TRADE GUIDE, supra note 129, at 29.
131. Van Dyke, supra note 90, at 507.
132. See Cottle, supra note 115, at 327 (discussing the abolition of the payment of
taxes as a qualification for voting).
133. Id. at 327-30.
134. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
135. Cottle, supra note 115, at 328-30.
136. See Id.; PRESIDENTIAL VOTE, supra note 121, at 8-9.
137. Harper v. Va. St. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 668.
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to argue that U.S. citizens in Puerto Rico should or would be re-
quired to pay federal taxes in order to vote" in national
elections. 140
E. The Fifty-first State
Over the past century, Puerto Rico has evolved from a "mere
possession"'141 of the United States to a commonwealth with state-
like status. 42 Its people enjoy U.S. citizenship and its government
is in complete harmony with the federal constitution. 143 Nearly
every federal agency operates in Puerto Rico and federal services
such as the postal system extend to the island. 44 Although Puerto
Ricans do not pay federal income taxes, 145 they have paid for their
citizenship in blood by being subject to the draft and continually
serving in the military.146
However, Puerto Rico will never be an equal part of the United
States unless it decides to make the transition to statehood. The
Supreme Court made sure of this when it decided the Insular
Cases147 nearly one hundred years ago. It is also apparent that to-
day's judiciary will continue to uphold these decisions and reaffirm
the plenary power of Congress over the island. 48 The courts sim-
ply will not diminish the significance of statehood by recognizing a
de facto state-like status for Puerto Rico. Thus, an effort to over-
turn the Insular Cases, though noble in cause, would be a futile
endeavor. Puerto Rico will continue to languish in the constitu-
tional phantom zone that lies between territories and states until it
opts for equality. Puerto Rico must take a bold step and free itself
from a doctrine of "constitutional authoritarianism 149 by demand-
ing to become the fifty-first state.
140. PRESIDENTIAL VOTE, supra note 121, at 9.
141. Supra note 62 and accompanying text.
142. TAX AND TRADE GUIDE, supra note 129, at 1.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Supra Part I.D.
146. Supra Part I.D.
147. Supra Part I.B.
148. Supra Part IA-B.
149. See Terrasa, supra note 19.
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II. SEEKING A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO VOTE IN
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Separate from the constitutional issues raised by the Insular
Cases is the question of whether United States citizenship entitles
the people of Puerto Rico to vote in presidential elections.
A. Relevant Caselaw
Since the 1970s, United States citizens living outside of the fifty
states have sought the right to vote in presidential elections
through the federal courts. In Sanchez v. United States,150 a Puerto
Rican citizen challenged the constitutionality of a statute allowing
the island's people to consent to commonwealth status,151 since it
did not explicitly include the right to vote in presidential elec-
tions. 152 In dismissing the action, the district court held that all citi-
zens do not have the right to vote in presidential elections because
"the Constitution does not, by its terms, grant citizens the right to
vote, but leaves the matter entirely to the States. ' 15 3 To support its
assertion that suffrage is not an essential right of citizenship, the
court cited several constitutional amendments dealing with voting
rights. 154 It noted that the Constitution had to be amended to
15156 ogrant women, 55 former slaves, residents of the District of Co-
lumbia,157 and eighteen, nineteen, and twenty-year-olds' 58 the right
to vote.
The court acknowledged Puerto Rico's transition to common-
wealth status1 59 and hinted that the island was no longer subject to
the plenary power of Congress under the Territory Clause.160 Nev-
ertheless, its opinion fell short of identifying any benefits gained by
this development in terms of political rights.16' The court earnestly
agreed, however, with the conclusion reached by an advisory group
partly formed by President Nixon, 62 which found that "it is inex-
150. Sanchez v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 239 (D.P.R. 1974).
151. Pub. L. No. 600, ch. 446, 64 Stat. 319 (1950) (current version at 48 U.S.C.
§§ 731b-731e (2002)).
152. Sanchez, 376 F. Supp. at 240.
153. Sanchez, 376 F. Supp. at 241.
154. Id.
155. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
156. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
157. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII.
158. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
159. Sanchez, 376 F. Supp. at 240-41.
160. Id. at 241.
161. Id.
162. See PRESIDENTIAL VOTE, supra note 121, at 1.
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cusable that there still exists a substantial number of U.S. citizens
who cannot legally vote" in presidential elections. 163
Following Sanchez, the Ninth Circuit decided Attorney General
of the Territory of Guam v. United States,164 in which four U.S. citi-
zens residing in Guam argued that voting in presidential elections
is a privilege of citizenship.165 In affirming the lower court's dis-
missal, the Ninth Circuit held that "[T]he Constitution does not
grant to American citizens the right to elect the President. ' 166 The
court explained that under Article II, the right to vote in presiden-
tial elections is given to the states, and citizens vote indirectly for
the president by voting for state electors. 67 The court noted that
"apart from the thirteen original states, the only areas which have
achieved national voting rights [without an amendment to the Con-
stitution] have done so by becoming States. 1' 68
In Igartua de la Rosa v. United States 1,169 two groups of Puerto
Rican citizens sought declaratory judgments granting them the
right to vote in presidential elections, based on the fact that they
were U.S. citizens. 7 ° The first group consisted of citizens that had
always resided in Puerto Rico.1 7' The second group was comprised
of former state citizens that had lost their right to vote in presiden-
tial elections by moving to Puerto Rico. 172 The court held that the
people of Puerto Rico could not participate in presidential elec-
tions until Puerto Rico either 1) became a state or 2) was granted
the right through a constitutional amendment.1 73 The two groups
of plaintiffs argued that Puerto Rico was entitled to national voting
rights because its political status closely resembled that of a
state. 7 However, the court assumed that it was being asked to
determine whether Puerto Rico had evolved into a de facto state175
and declined to settle the issue, invoking the political question doc-
163. Sanchez, 376 F. Supp. at 242.
164. Territory of Guam v. United States, 738 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1984).
165. Id. at 1018.
166. Id. at 1019.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Igartua de la Rosa v. United States I, 842 F. Supp. 607, 608 aftd, 32 F.3d 8
(1994).
170. Id. at 608.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 609.
174. Id.
175. It is certainly arguable that Puerto Rico is a de facto state for certain purposes.
For example, in Sanchez the court explicitly stated that Puerto Rico is not a territory.
Sanchez v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 239, 241 (D.P.R. 1974).
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trine.17 6 The court held that "a determination of whether or not
Puerto Rico's political status has evolved into 'de facto' statehood
for the purposes of presidential elections would correspond to
Congress... [and] ... no standards exist by which a Court can or
should decide what is or is not a 'de facto' state.' 177
The former state citizens group also argued that the Uniformed
and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act ("UOCAVA") 1 78 was
unconstitutional because it violated the Due Process Clause and
the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment1 79 by al-
lowing citizens living abroad to vote in presidential elections, with-
out extending the same opportunity to citizens who relocate to
Puerto Rico. 180 The court dismissed this argument, holding that
the UOCAVA did not, by its terms, prohibit former stateside citi-
zens that resided in Puerto Rico from voting in presidential elec-
tions, and that it was for the states to determine whether their
former residents could vote by absentee ballot. 181
The court also concluded that the UOCAVA would pass consti-
tutional muster.182 It reasoned that the UOCAVA distinguished
between those who reside overseas and those who live anywhere in
the U.S. and thus did not single out those who moved to Puerto
Rico.'83 In affirming the dismissal, the court of appeals added that
"[W]hile the [UOCAVA] does not guarantee that a citizen moving
to Puerto Rico will be eligible to vote in a presidential election, this
limitation is not a consequence of the Act, but of the constitu-
tional" restrictions implicit in Article 11.184
176. Igartua de la Rosa I, 842 F. Supp. at 609-10. The political question doctrine is a
judicial principle premised on the separation of powers that requires courts to refuse
to decide an issue that is within the discretionary power of the executive or legislative
branches of the government. See id. (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)
(holding that a political question exists where, among other things, the Constitution
has committed resolution of the issue to another branch of the government)).
177. Igartua de la Rosa I, 842 F. Supp. at 609-10.
178. Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff
(2000).
179. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (apply-
ing equal protection principles to the federal government, even though the Fifth
Amendment does not contain an Equal Protection Clause).
180. Igartua de la Rosa I, 842 F. Supp at 610-12.
181. Id. at 611.
182. Id. The court applied low-level scrutiny. It held that the UOCAVA was reason-
ably related to the proper legislative purpose of allowing citizens living abroad to vote
in federal elections. Id.
183. Id. at 611.
184. Igartua de la Rosa 1, 32 F.3d at 11.
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Igartua de la Rosa v. United State H,185 decided in 2000,
presented identical facts to those in Igartua de la Rosa L186 Al-
though the district court's decision failed to spark a national de-
bate, its opinion deserves political and scholarly attention for
several reasons. First, the court called attention to Puerto Rico's
problematic political status, 187 noting that Puerto Rico's status
within the U.S. must be viewed "within the context of the unful-
filled promises of freedom."' 88 The court then briefly discussed 1)
how the U.S. acquired Puerto Rico;189 2) the U.S. Supreme Court's
views on Puerto Rico's status within the U.S.;1 90 3) the granting of
citizenship to the people of Puerto Rico; 191 and 4) Puerto Rico's
transition to commonwealth status. 192 Next, the court offered a
broad interpretation of Article II, § 1, cl. of the U.S. Constitution.
Article II provides that "Each State shall appoint, in such a Man-
ner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors,
equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to
which the State may be entitled in the Congress.' 93 The court re-jected the conclusions reached in Sanchez, Guam, and Igartua de la
Rosa I, and held that Article II does not limit the right to choose
the president to the states, but merely provides the logistics by
which state residents participate in presidential elections. 94 It fur-
ther held that if U.S. citizens living in Puerto Rico had the right to
participate in presidential elections, such a right could not be de-
rived from Article 1 1.195 Finally, the court concluded that the right
to vote is a function of citizenship 196 and that U.S. citizens residing
in Puerto Rico have the right to participate in presidential elec-
185. Igartua de la Rosa v. United States II, 113 F. Supp. 2d 228 (D.P.R.), rev'd, 229
F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 2000). Note, the district court adopted and incorporated its prior
opinion denying the government's motion to dismiss. Id. at 231. Therefore, Igartua de
la Rosa v. United States II, 107 F. Supp. 2d 140 (D.P.R. 2000), must be read as part of
the district court's final opinion.
186. The court followed part of the holding in Igartua de la Rosa I and dismissed
the plaintiff's cause of action under UOCAVA. Igartua de la Rosa H, 107 F. Supp. 2d
at 150.
187. 107 F. Supp. 2d at 141.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 142-44.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
194. Igartua de la Rosa H, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 145.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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tions.197 This holding was based on the fact that U.S. history is
"largely characterized by the enfranchisement of segments within
its citizenry" '198 and on the consistent acknowledgement by the Su-
preme Court that voting is a fundamental right. 199
The First Circuit reversed the district court's decision solely on
the grounds of stare decisis.20 ' The court held that the district
court was required to follow the decision in Igartua de la Rosa I
because the facts were virtually identical to those in that case. 20 1
The court added that although the Supreme Court had repeatedly
held that the right to vote was fundamental, no case held that the
right to vote in a presidential election was derived from any source
other than Article 11.202
In Judge Torruella's concurring opinion, he found the court's de-
cision to be technically correct based on the explicit language in
Article 11.203 He noted, however, that Puerto Rico is politically
powerless and suggested that in the future, a court may be com-
pelled to "fill the vacuum created by the failure or refusal of the
political branches to protect the civil rights" of these loyal citi-
zens. 20 4 Torruella argued that the continued disenfranchisement of
the United States citizens residing in Puerto Rico could provide a
solid basis for judicial intervention. 20 5 Although Judge Torruella's
opinion did not discuss when or how the judiciary should intervene,
his book The Supreme Court and Puerto Rico: The Doctrine of Sep-
arate and UnequaF0 6 reveals his views on the matter. Judge Tor-
ruella believes that the Insular Cases20 7 stand at par with Plessy v.
Ferguson20 8 by permitting unequal treatment for U.S. citizens living
in Puerto Rico.20 9 Furthermore, he argues that cases like Brown v.
197. Id. at 150.
198. Id. at 145.
199. Id. at 146; Igartua de la Rosa H, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 231-35.
200. Igartua de la Rosa H, 229 F.3d at 84-85.
201. Id. at 83-85.
202. Id. at 84-85.
203. Id. at 85 (Torruella, J., concurring).
204. Id. at 89 (Torruella, J., concurring) (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954) and United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938)).
205. Id. (Torruella, J., concurring).
206. TORRUELLA, supra note 37, at 3.
207. Supra Part I.B.
208. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
209. TORRUELLA, supra note 37, at 3.
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Board of Education provide a resounding precedent2 ° for over-
turning the obsolete doctrines created by the Insular Cases.211
The First and Ninth Circuits have the better argument. Article II
explicitly grants the responsibility of electing the president and
vice-president to the states.212 Puerto Rico is not a state. There-
fore, Puerto Rico and its residents do not have the right to partici-
pate in presidential elections.1 3 Still, the district court's argument
in Igartua H is worth considering because it attempts to reinterpret
the explicit language of Article II (i.e., reducing the states' power
to choose the president to a procedural formula) by declaring that
suffrage is based on citizenship.21 4
B. Is There a Fundamental Right to Vote?
The district court's decision in Igartua de la Rosa II seems cor-
rect in principle. The United States is a constitutional democ-
215racy. Accordingly, all citizens should have the right to vote in
presidential elections regardless of their residence. In discussing
this issue, however, one must put aside the specifics of presidential
elections and the distinction between citizens who reside in states
and those who reside in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.216 It is
essential to focus solely on the district court's basic assertion in
Igartua de la Rosa H - that the Constitution guarantees a general
right to vote to all citizens.217
There are three major views on whether suffrage is a basic right
belonging to all citizens.218 Under a "traditional view," the right to
vote is not a basic right21 9 and the Constitution does not guarantee
any person the right to vote.220 Under a "relative right view, 221
the question of whether the Constitution recognizes a substantive
210. Igartua de la Rosa v. United States H, 229 F.3d 80, 89 (1st Cir. 2000) (Torruella,
J., concurring).
211. TORRUELLA, supra note 37, at 3.
212. Supra notes 150 to 184 and accompanying text.
213. Id.
214. Infra Part II.B.
215. Lowi & GINSBERG, supra note 111, at 13.
216. Supra Part II.A.
217. Supra Part HI.A.
218. See Symposium, Is There a Constitutional Right to Vote and Be Represented?:
The Case of the District of Columbia, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 589, 605-33 (1999) (examin-
ing the merits of a lawsuit challenging the lack of congressional representation in the
District of Columbia) [hereinafter Symposium].
219. Id. at 609.
220. E.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874) (holding that the
recently ratified Fourteenth Amendment does not extend voting rights to women).
221. Symposium, supra note 218, at 613, 626.
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right to vote is left unanswered.222 Instead, this view merely ac-
knowledges a limited, but nonetheless fundamental right to vote
based on principles of equal protection.223 Under the "citizenship-
based view," the right to vote is a fundamental right guaranteed to
all citizens. The basis for each of these views is discussed below.
1. The Traditional View
Under the traditional view, United States citizens residing in Pu-
erto Rico would have no basis for a right to vote in presidential
elections. The traditional view is expressed in Minor v. Happer-
sett,224 an infamous case in which Virginia Minor, a woman's suffra-
gist, argued that she was guaranteed the right to vote under the
Fourteenth Amendment. She had attempted to register as a voter
in Missouri. The Missouri state constitution, however, confined the
right of suffrage to men.225 Mrs. Minor asserted that she was a
citizen under the Fourteenth Amendment Citizenship Clause, and
thus was entitled to all the privileges and immunities enjoyed by
other citizens.226 She essentially made two arguments for the right
to vote: 1) the right to vote is a privilege of citizenship and 2) equal
protection requires equal voting rights between men and
women.
227
The Court began its opinion by noting that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not confer citizenship on women, because women
have always been citizens of the United States. 228 It then briefly
examined the text of the Constitution and found no indication that
the right to vote was intended to be extended to all citizens of the
United States. 229 The Court emphasized the fact that a constitu-
tional amendment was required to prevent the right of suffrage
from being denied on account of race. 23° Finally, the Court held
that the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment added nothing to
privileges and immunities of citizenship and so did not guarantee
women the right to vote.23' The Court concluded by stating that it
222. See id. at 613.
223. Id.
224. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
225. Id. at 163-65.
226. Id.
227. Minor, 88 U.S. at 163-65.
228. Id. at 170.
229. Id. at 173-74.
230. Id. at 175; U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
231. Minor, 88 U.S. at 173, 177-78. The Court did not make an equal protection
analysis because the issue was framed around the "privileges and immunities" of citi-
zenship. Id. at 163-65.
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was "unanimously of the opinion that the Constitution of the
United States does not confer the right of suffrage upon any-
one." '32 Under this line of reasoning, citizens in Puerto Rico
would have no right to participate in presidential elections without
an amendment to the Constitution or the attainment of statehood
by Puerto Rico.
2. The Relative Right View
Subsequent developments in constitutional law led the Supreme
Court to treat the right to vote as a relative right under the Equal
Protection Clause. For example, in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez,33 the Court noted that:
Since the right to vote, per se, is not a constitutionally pro-
tected right, we assume that ... references to that right are sim-
ply shorthand references to the protected right, implicit in our
constitutional system, to participate in state elections on an
equal basis with other qualified voters whenever the State has
adopted an elective process for determining who will represent
any segment of the State's population. 34
This view is narrower with respect to presidential elections. In
Bush v. Gore,35 the Court noted:
The individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote
for electors for the President of the United States unless and until
the state legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to
implement its power to appoint members of the Electoral College.
History has now favored the voter and in each of the several States
the citizens themselves vote for Presidential electors. When the
state legislatures vests the right to vote for President in its people,
the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental;
and one source of its fundamental nature lies in the equal weight
accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter.236
Under this relative right view, constitutional protection for the
right to vote must be triggered by a state's choice to grant the right
to its citizens.237 This approach has been criticized as a "misguided
commitment to [the traditional view] . . . that is not only rigid
but . . . willfully blind . . . to the developments in constitutional
232. Minor, 88 U.S. at 178.
233. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
234. Id. at 36 n.78.
235. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam).
236. Id.
237. See supra notes 233-236 and accompanying text.
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thought that have taken place since the framing. ' 238 Arguably this
view is fundamentally flawed because it does not reflect the mod-
ern reality of the right to vote, (i.e., all fifty states have delegated
much of their power to the people by adopting systems through
which their citizens elect national representatives). 239 Furthermore,
the few geographical subdivisions of the United States that have
failed to implement a mechanism for participating in national elec-
tions are those without the power to do so. 24° Nonetheless, as dis-
cussed infra, the Supreme Court has been instrumental in
expanding the "relative right" of suffrage. The Court's develop-
ment of this area of the law should not, however, be interpreted as
creating a right to vote based on citizenship, as argued in Igartua de
la Rosa 11.241
a. The Fundamental Nature of Voting
Although the Supreme Court's active role in the development of
voting rights is a relatively recent development, the Court has rec-
ognized the importance of voting rights for some time. In Yick Wo
v. Hopkins,242 the Court invalidated a facially neutral California
law regulating laundries because the law was applied exclusively
against Chinese laundry owners.243 The Court noted that "the very
idea that one man may be compelled to hold.., any material right
essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another,
seems intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being
the essence of slavery itself. There are many illustrations that
might be given of this truth, . . . the political franchise of voting is
one." 244 The Court reasoned that voting is regarded as a funda-
mental right because it is "preservative of all rights. ' 245 A modern
restatement of this principle can be found in Wesberry v. Sand-
ers,246 where the Court held that a state could not maintain discrim-
inatory federal congressional districts.247 After a thorough review
of the relevant constitutional history, the Court noted that suffrage
238. Symposium, supra note 218, at 614.
239. Supra note 236 and accompanying text.
240. See supra Part II.A.
241. Supra Part II.A.
242. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (holding that a facially neutral
law may violate the Equal Protection Clause if it is administered in a racially discrimi-
natory manner).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1964).
247. Id.
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is vitally important in a free country because even the most basic
rights become illusory when the right to vote is undermined.248
The Court added: "Our Constitution leaves no room for classifica-
tion of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges this right. 249
The Court has also expressed the importance of presidential
elections. In Anderson v. Celebrezze ° the Court struck down an
Ohio statute that required early filing deadlines for presidential
candidates-a practice that particularly harmed third-party candi-
dates.2 5' Stressing the unique importance of presidential elections,
the Court noted that "the President and Vice President of the
United States are the only elected officials who represent all the
voters in the Nation. ' 252 It added that the public's interest in se-
lecting candidates for national office is greater than any interest of
an individual state. 3
Even the current Supreme Court, with its affinity for the Tenth
Amendment, 254 has held that the fundamental importance of vot-
ing is paramount to a state's power to regulate elections. In United
States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,255 the Court invalidated term
limits for federal senators and congressmen imposed by the Arkan-
sas Constitution.256 The Court placed great emphasis on the "fun-
damental principle of our representative democracy . . . that the
people should choose whom they please to govern them. ' 25 7 The
Court indicated that this broad principle incorporates two funda-
mental ideas: 1) the concept that the opportunity to be elected
must be open to all citizens258 and 2) "the critical postulate that
sovereignty is vested in the people, and that sovereignty confers on
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
251. Id. at 794.
252. Id. at 794-95.
253. Id. at 795.
254. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating the Brady
Act, which required local law enforcement officers to investigate prospective handgun
purchasers); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking down a federal
law requiring states that failed to plan for the disposal of radioactive waste by a par-
ticular date, to assume ownership of such waste and liability resulting from failure to
do so); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding that states
are immune from federal control over operations in areas of traditional state govern-
ment functions) overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985).
255. United Stares Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 793-96 (1995).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 793 (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)).
258. Id. at 793-94.
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the people the right to choose freely their representatives to the
National Government. 259
Although these cases support the idea that suffrage is one of the
most basic political rights in the United States, they do not pro-
claim that the right is based on citizenship. Yick Wo is not a voting
rights case. Wesberry merely holds that state citizens have the right
to elect their federal representatives on an equal basis with their
fellow state citizens. Anderson deals with the rights of presidential
candidates, and U.S. Term Limits simply holds that states lack the
power to impose qualifications for congressional offices in addition
to those outlined in the Constitution.
b. One-Person-One-Vote
The landmark voting rights case of the last century was Reynolds
v. Sims, 260 which established the rule of one-person-one-vote. 261 In
Reynolds, the Court invalidated the apportionment of the Alabama
legislature and two of the state's proposed reapportionment
schemes.2 62 Alabama had not reapportioned its state voting dis-
tricts since 1900, resulting in gross imbalances in the relative weight
of votes among the districts.263 Tracing a long history of voting
rights cases, the Court stated, "the Constitution . . .protects the
right of all qualified citizens to vote, in state as well as federal elec-
tions. ' 264 The Court also reaffirmed the Yick Wo principle, noting
that the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free society
and that restrictions on the right had to be "meticulously scruti-
nized. "265 With this, the Court remarked that it is unjustifiable to
allow the votes of citizens to be weighed differently based on resi-
dence. 66 The Court further noted that "representative govern-
259. Id. at 794.
260. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
261. Id. The one-person-one-vote doctrine provides that each person's vote must be
given the same relative weight of all other votes. Note the following illustration: State
X has a population of 400,000 and is divided into three voting districts. Each district
elects one state senator. Voting district A has 100,000 citizens. Voting district B also
has 100,000 citizens. Voting district C has 200,000 citizens. According to population,
district C should have as much voting power as districts A and B combined. This is not
the case, however, because district C only elects one senator while districts A and B
together elect two. Thus, votes in district C are worth half as much as they would be in
districts A and B, consequently violating the rule of one-person-one-vote.
262. The existing scheme, as well as the two reapportionment schemes, were not
based on population. Id. at 537-53.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 554.
265. Id. at 561-62.
266. Id. at 563.
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ment is in essence self-government through the medium of elected
representatives of the people ' 267 and that "To the extent that a citi-
zen's right to vote is debased, he is that much less a citizen. '268
Despite its landmark status, Reynolds did not rewrite the Consti-
tution by declaring a right to vote based on citizenship. Rather,
Reynolds strongly reaffirmed the relative right to vote by acknowl-
edging that the right belongs to all qualified citizens. The holding
states that the Equal Protection Clause forbids states from adopt-
ing or maintaining discriminatory voting schemes.26 9 Thus, even
under Reynolds, U.S. citizens who reside in Puerto Rico cannot
participate in presidential elections because they are not qualified
citizens under Article II.
c. The Evolving Right to Vote in Federal Enclaves
The Supreme Court has in fact held that the Equal Protection
Clause could extend the right to vote in state elections to areas
under federal control. In Evans v. Cornman, T° the Court affirmed
a decision granting the residents of a federal enclave 271 located
within Maryland the right to vote in Maryland elections.27 2 The
Court's decision conflicted with numerous state court decisions 273
that denied residents of federal enclaves the right to vote because
the states had no jurisdiction over them.274 In acknowledging the
rights of these citizens, the Evans Court relied on the principle that
"the right to vote, [as] a citizen's link to his laws and government, is
protective of all fundamental rights and privileges. '275 While fed-
eral enclaves are not states and Congress has exclusive power over
them, the Court justified its holding by recognizing that the rela-
267. Id. at 564.
268. Id. at 567.
269. Id. at 584.
270. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 426 (1970).
271. Federal enclaves are areas of land over which the United States exercises ex-
clusive legislative authority. Common examples of federal enclaves include: the Dis-
trict of Columbia, military bases, and national parks. Andrew C. Mergen, Surface
Tension: The Problem of Federal/Private Split Estate Lands, 33 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 419, 437 (1998) (discussing the Enclave Clause of the Constitution).
272. Id.
273. See, e.g., Herken v. Glynn, 101 P.2d 946 (Kan. 1940); Arledge v. Mabry, 197
P.2d 884 (N.M. 1948); McMahon v. Polk, 73 N.W. 77 (S.D. 1897); State ex rel. Lyle v.
Willett, 97 S.W. 299 (Tenn. 1906). But see Arapajolu v. McMenamin, 249 P.2d 318
(Cal. Ct. App. 1952); Rothfels v. Southworth, 356 P.2d 612 (Utah 1960); Adams v.
Londeree, 83 S.E.2d 127 (W. Va. 1954).
274. Evans, 398 U.S. at 423.
275. Id. at 422.
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tionships between federal enclaves and their host States have
evolved considerably. 276
Although the Court acknowledges the importance of the right to
vote, it falls far short of recognizing a citizenship-based right. The
Court even made clear that it applied a relative right analysis when
it stated: "[O]nce the franchise [of voting] is granted to the electo-
rate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal
Protection Clause. 2 77 Furthermore, the status of the federal en-
clave in Evans is distinguishable from Puerto Rico's status with re-
spect to presidential elections. The federal enclave in Evans was
located within a state and its residents were subject to a wide array
of state laws,278 whereas Puerto Rico is many miles away from the
nearest state and has its own local government.279
d. The Fundamental Right to Travel
The right to travel is an essential attribute of citizenship. 280 Al-
though one may not immediately associate the right to travel with
national voting rights, both are relevant when discussing Puerto
Rico since state residents lose the right to vote in presidential elec-
tions by moving to the island.2 8' In Shapiro v. Thompson,282 the
Court invalidated laws enacted by Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and
the District of Columbia, which imposed one-year residency re-
quirements for recipients of welfare assistance. 83 The Court found
that these laws imposed an undue burden on the fundamental right
to travel:
This Court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal
Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite
to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length
and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regula-
tions which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement. 84
276. Id. at 423.
277. Id. at 422.
278. Id. at 424. Residents of the enclave were subject to certain state criminal laws;
state income, gasoline, sales, and use taxes; state unemployment and workmen's com-
pensation laws; state automobile laws; and the process and jurisdiction of state courts.
Id. In addition, they could use the state court and school systems. Id.
279. Supra Part I.C.
280. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1969) (discussing the fundamental
right to travel), overruled on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974).
281. Supra Part II.A.
282. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 621-27.
283. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-2d (Supp. 1965); D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-203 (1967); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 432 (6) (West 1968).
284. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629.
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These principles were recently reaffirmed in Saenz v. Roe,285 a
case in which a California statute limiting the maximum welfare
benefits available to new residents was held unconstitutional. The
Court explained that in Shapiro, it held "that a classification that
had the effect of imposing a penalty on the right to travel ' ' 28 6 vio-
lated the principles of equal protection.287 The Court then outlined
three components of the right to travel: 1) the right to freely enter
and leave states, 2) the right to be treated as a welcome visitor
when you travel outside your home state and 3) the right to perma-
nently move to another state and be treated like other citizens of
that state.288 The Court found the basis for the third component in
the Fourteenth Amendment Citizenship Clause28 9 and noted that
the Clause expressly equates citizenship with residence and does
not tolerate subclasses of similarly situated citizens.29 °
The Court has also made similar findings within the context of
voting rights. In Dunn v. Blumstein, 91 the Court invalidated a stat-
ute imposing a one-year residency requirement for voting eligibil-
ity. In addition to burdening the right to vote, the Court held that
such a requirement "directly impinges on the exercise of a second
fundamental personal right, the right to travel. 292
While, these cases do not acknowledge a right to vote based on
citizenship, they do support the relative right view of voting and
they recognize that a state citizen will lose the right to vote in presi-
dential elections simply by moving to Puerto Rico. As the Court
held in Saenz, when a citizen moves to a new state or territory, he
or she must be treated like the citizens who reside there.293
3. The Citizenship-Based View
Modern conceptions of the right to vote are deeply imbedded in
our jurisprudence 294 and politics. 295 This has led to the general be-
285. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 492 (1999).
286. Id. at 490, 499.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 500.
289. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside.").
290. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 506-07.
291. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972).
292. Id.
293, Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500.
294. Symposium, supra note 218, at 606; supra Part III.B.
295. See e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XV (prohibiting denial of the right to vote based
on race); U.S. CoNST. amend. XVII (providing for the direct election of senators);
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lief that the right to vote is a substantive fundamental political right
belonging to all citizens. 96 Under this view, the origin of the right
to vote is unclear. Some argue that the Constitution creates a sub-
stantive right to vote.297 Others assert that the right is recognized
by the Constitution, but not created by it.298 Rather, the people
through their inherent right to vote form the basis for the govern-
ment and the Constitution.299 Under a third line of reasoning, the
right was created by the history of the development of constitu-
tional principles such as equal protection and due process.300 This
third line of thinking seems to be the one followed by the district
court in Igartua de la Rosa 11.301 The court cites Yick Wo, Reyn-
olds, U.S. Term Limits, Wesberry, Anderson, Evans, and a number
of other cases, asserting that the cumulative force of these deci-
sions forms the basis for a right to vote based on citizenship. 30 2
Although this view has had some academic support, °3 it is not
the law.30 4 The Supreme Court cases that arguably support a citi-
zenship-based view of voting have been discussed earlier.30 5 These
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (prohibiting denial of the right to vote based on sex); U.S.
CONST. amend. XXIII (providing the formula by which the District of Columbia par-
ticipates in presidential elections); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (prohibiting the impo-
sition of any tax as a prerequisite to voting in federal elections); U.S. CONST. amend.
XXVI (enfranchising eighteen, nineteen, and twenty-year-old citizens).
296. Symposium, supra note 218, at 622.
297. Id. at 613 ("[D]enying that the U.S. Constitution grants a substantive right to
vote to people has got to be wrong.").
298. Id. at 610.
299. See id.
300. Id. at 624-25.
301. See Igartua de la Rosa v. United States 11, 107 F. Supp. 2d 140, 145-47 (D.P.R.
2000) (noting that the history of the United States is largely characterized by the
enfranchisement of its citizenry and that the Supreme Court has been consistent in
acknowledging the fundamental importance of the right to vote).
302. Id.; Igartua de la Rosa 11, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 232-35.
303. See Jamin B. Raskin, Is This America? The District of Columbia And The
Right To Vote, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 39 (arguing for congressional representa-
tion in the District of Columbia).
304. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam) (noting that individuals
have no constitutional right to participate in presidential elections); San Antonio In-
dep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 n.78 (1973) (noting that the right to vote is
not per se constitutionally protected).
305. United Stares Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 793-96 (1995); An-
derson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (invalidated term limits for federal senators
and congressmen imposed by Arkansas); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972)
(invalidating a statute that required one year of state residency as a prerequisite for
state voting eligibility); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 426 (1970) (holding that
residents of a federal enclave located within Maryland had a right to participate in
Maryland state elections); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964) (holding that
states may not establish or maintain disproportionate state voting districts); Wesberry
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cases illustrate a relative right to vote based on the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.3"6 Furthermore, the Court continues to acknowledge
that the Constitution does not guarantee anyone the right to
vote. 30 7 The citizenship-based view is a misinterpretation of the
relative right view. As the Court artfully explains in Reynolds, the
Constitution merely "protects the right of all qualified citizens to
vote. '30 8 Unfortunately, citizens who reside in Puerto Rico are not
qualified to vote in national elections under Article II.
C. Revisiting the Argument for Statehood
Puerto Rico is a commonwealth. The significance of that partic-
ular designation is ambiguous. What is clear is that Article II of
the Constitution grants states the right to elect the president and
vice-president.30 9 It is also clear that the right to vote is not based
on citizenship, 31 0 and that Puerto Rico will not be able to partici-
pate in presidential elections unless it becomes a state or is granted
the right through a constitutional amendment. 31' Thus, seeking the
right to vote in presidential elections through the federal court sys-
tem is even more futile than fighting to overturn the Insular Cases.
The language of the Twenty-third Amendment,312 which grants
the District of Columbia the right to participate in presidential
elections, shows that an amendment may not be the appropriate
solution for Puerto Rico. The Twenty-third Amendment merely
grants the District "[a] number of electors ... equal to the whole
number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which [it]
would be entitled if it were a State, but in no event more than the
least populous state. 31 3 Thus, the District cannot have more elec-
tors than the least populous state, even if its population would nor-
mally warrant additional electors. The latest census figures
v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1964) (holding that states may not establish or maintain
disproportionate federal voting districts); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370
(1886) (noting in dicta that the political franchise of voting is an essential right).
306. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 36 n.78 (1973) (noting that refer-
ences to fundamental right of suffrage "are simply shorthand references to the pro-
tected right, implicit in our constitutional system, to participate in state elections on
an equal basis with other qualified voters whenever the State has adopted an elective
process").
307. Id.; Bush, 531 U.S. at 104.
308. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 554.
309. Supra Part II.A.
310. Supra Part II.B.3.
311. Supra Part II.A.
312. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII.
313. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII (emphasis added).
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indicate that the District of Columbia has a mere 572,000 re-
sidents,314 compared to Puerto Rico's 3.8 million.315 As Puerto
Rico would be entitled to approximately eight electoral votes,316 a
similar limitation would grossly dilute the votes of its people. Fur-
thermore, it should also be noted that such an amendment would
not cure Puerto Rico's lack of congressional representation. Only
statehood will give Puerto Rico full national voting rights.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has highlighted two of Puerto Rico's major con-
stitutional dilemmas. According to the Insular Cases, Puerto Rico
is subject to the plenary power of Congress under the Territory
Clause and its people are not entitled to any political rights. Pu-
erto Rico also has no right to participate in presidential elections
under Article II of the Constitution. Judge Torruella advocates
overturning the Insular Cases, but this is no small task because the
Supreme Court continues to rely on them and uphold their validity.
Cases like Sanchez, Igartua de la Rosa I, and Igartua de la Rosa H
futilely attempt to secure the right to vote in presidential elections
by asking federal courts to ignore the explicit language in Article
II. Furthermore, neither approach would solve both of these con-
stitutional dilemmas. The only complete solution is for Puerto
Rico to become the fifty-first state.
314. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 9, at 21.
315. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 9, at 812.
316. Ivan Roman, No Vote For President In Puerto Rico, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB-
UNE, Nov. 3, 2000, at All (discussing a ruling by the Puerto Rico Supreme Court
declaring the use of funds for Puerto Rico's possible participation in the 2000 presi-
dential elections unconstitutional).
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